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BOOK REVIEWS
The Law in Quest of Itself. By Lon L. Fuller. Chicago: The Foundation Press, Inc: 1940. Pp. vi, 147. $2.00.
Professor Fuller's book, recording three lectures at Northwestern
University, is unmistakable evidence that we have definitely emerged
from the doldrums in which so much of published American jurisprudence has stagnated in the recent past. For, whatever limitations may
be found in this book-arid I propose to suggest some-the careful
reader will agree that it is thoughtful, balanced, and clear; that it represents scholarship, which, it is apparent, stems from long cultivation of
philosophy in general, and much reflection.
For Professor Fuller the principal problem in contemporary jurisprudence "is that of choosing between two competing directions of legal
thought which may be labelled naturallaw and legal positizdsm" (p. 4).
By the latter he means "that direction of legal thought which insists on
drawing a sharp distinction between the law that is and the law that
ought to be." "Natural law, on the other hand, is the view which denies
the possibility of a rigid separation of the is and the ought, and which
tolerates a confusion of them in legal discussion" (p. 5). Professor
Fuller's thesis is that "it is impossible to take a sharp distinction between the law that is and the law that ought to be" (p. 108). From this
central position he subjects Legal Positivism to criticism that is sometimes brilliant, and is always stimulating and thoughtful. To illustrate
his critique, he describes the process of repeating, a story-the facts
actually told rniingle inextricably with the raconteur's conception of what
the tale "ought to be"; again, he points out the over-lapping of such
questions as: "is this a steam engine," and "is this a good steam engine?" So, too, of interpreting a statute or deciding a case: what is
coalesces with what ought to be; and the positivists are arbitrary and
unreal when they set up a rigid dichotomy. After developing the above
thesis in general ferms, the author concludes the first lecture with a
brief historical survey of Legal Positivism (meaning the analytical
schools including The Pure Theory) as represented in Hobbes, Austin,
and Kelsen.
The second lecture is an analysis of American Legal Realism and of
the Pure Theory of Law. His criticism of the Realists supplements
his earlier well-known essay ;1 Professor Fuller is here revealed at his
best as one of the most acute legal philosophers in this country. His
criticism of the Pure Theory is a valuable supplement to the scant
literature in English on this influential school of thought; but his stric'Fuller. American Legal Realism (1934) 82 U. OF PA. L. REv. 429.
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tures on the significance of the School are debatable, and will shortly be
considered. The final lecture discusses the Natural Law method, which
is praised as the one "men naturally follow", and, moreover, as much
closer to reality-despite the claims of positivists to the contrary. The
lecture closes with stress on the emptiness of Positivism so far as a
philosophy of democracy is concerned, and with an eloquent plea for
faith in reason and for a richer legal scholarship, which, freed from the
restraints of positivism, will be encouraged to grapple with problems vital
to our legal and political order.
In as succinct a statement as is provided in this little book, it is
inevitable that many issues are not as fully defined as one would wish;
even though the book is obviously the product of long, painstaking
thought, one cannot be certain of the writer's position on various important questions that come to mind. A reviewer is even more seriously
handicapped in this regard, and I can only hope that the issues raised
in the following criticism will some day find a more adequate forum.
Practically all of what follows is conditioned further by uncertainty as
to Professor Fuller's interpretation of "Natural Law" and "Legal Positivism."
His initial line of demarcation-that positivists sharply separate Is
from Ought whereas Natural Law writers "tolerate a confusion of
them", is questionable as the most significant approach available.
Austin's great contribution was not the invention of the dualism between
natural and positive law. That dualism he found in a tradition extending
back to the Greeks, i.e., in the Natural Law writers themselves. Austin
clarified the thus-established dichotomy; he analyzed the'elements of
morality and of positive law, and drew the long-existing lines much
more clearly than any predecessor. Secondly, having made the clarification between the two domains, he developed the logic of law, the
notion of system in law; in this regard he was far in advance of continental thought, and, as Professor Fuller suggests, the herald of the
Pure Theory. Hence, I should argue that the major difference is not
that the one drew the Is-Ought distinction sharply and the other did not,
but rather that the Natural Law writers emphasized ethical appraisal of
municipal laws, whereas the analytical writers were chiefly interested in
the form of municipal laws. In short, whereas the former are moral
philosophers, the latter are logicians.
Pursuing his original line of distinction in the manner stated above,
Professor Fuller is led into a position of denying that there is any
validity to distinguishing law that is from what it ought to be. This,
it seems to me, leads him into error; he is on firm ground when he attacks the superficiality of various attempts by American Realists to
describe empirical phenomena (the judicial process), and in that course,
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omitting to consider the moral attitudes of the judges. But all of this
is description of factual phenomena; Professor Fuller argues as a more
sophisticated scientist of the phenomena to be explained. But moral
attitudes are not ethical principles; the former are social facts that have
origins, histories and effects; the latter are ideas which can be comprehended, criticized and communicated. We may ask questions about
the character, intensity, etc. of existing attitudes concerning the desirability of a course of conduct or of an adjudication. Quite a 'different
kind of inquiry asks whether certain conduct ought to be pursued,
whether a statute or decision is right or good. Failure to develop this
distinction leaves uncertainty and more than a suspicion that Professor
Fuller is not a Natural Law philosopher, at least, in any traditional
sense. It may very well be that Professor Fuller was interested only
in the first sort of inquiry and that he would readily grant the propriety
of the second. But his neglect to distinguish the two (in effect, sociology from ethics) brings him perilously close to denying the existence of
ethics entirely. On the other hand, in a number of instances Professor
Fuller himself reveals how deeply ingrained (and separable!) is the
difference between Is and Ought (see, e.g., pages 13, 14, 15, 111, 112).
The second major problem that needs discussion is Professor Fuller's joinder of the Analytical School (Pure Theory) and American
Legal Realism as essentially alike. He refers to them as "seeming
opposites" and goes on to argue that they "have much in common both
in their methods and in the results they achieve" (p. 76) ; it is their
common features which he elaborates. Now such a view is defensible,
but I doubt that it leads to the most incisive analysis possible; certainly
it is inadequate as concerns the so-called Legal Positivists. The American Realists spring directly from Positivism in sociology-specifically
from Comte who made the term current. It is unfortunate that "positive" has also been employed to describe Analytical Jurisprudence. In
that context, the term was used to distinguish municipal law from
ethics; the sociological connotation, especially in its extreme mechanistic form, is at the very opposite pole. Professor Fuller recognizes this,
but casually; yet the differences between American Legal Realism and
the Analytical Schools are, I think, of greater significance than their
similarity. Legal and sociological "positivism" clash on the most vital
issues that have divided philosophers since Plato.
Accordingly, and in light, also, of the distinction drawn traditionally
and validly between Existence and Value, I do not follow Professor
Fuller when he argues that the major defect in American Legal Realism is the sharp dichotomy it draws between Is and Ought. As stated,
I fully agree with him that since these Realists purport to describe
factual phenomena (the judicial process), the above dichotomy consti-
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tutes their chief deficiency in that regard. But viewing the School in
the large (as the translation of Comtian and mechanical positivism to
facts relevant in law), I should argue that their major defect is their
anti-conceptualism (I use the term merely for brevity). Whereas Professor Fuller has stressed moral attitudes in order to establish the inseparability of Is and Ought, I should argue that of even greater significance (when set against the history of philosophy) is the American
Realists' discounting, sometimes completely ignoring, the influence of
rules of law.
As regards Analytical Jurisprudence, it is apparent that Professor
Fuller frequently displays considerable hostility, which, I think, is unwarranted. I share his criticism as to some of the "Legal Ppsitivists",
especially as regards their views on. political ethics, but this must be
distinguished from Legal Positivism-the error of logicians is hardly a
valid ground for dismissing logic. If the legal positivists remained consistent with their own preachment (as did Austin rather well) they
would eschew disparagement (or praise) of ethics. For it is one thing
to assert that the Pure Theory is utterly indifferent to ethics; it is another to assert that ethics is mere ideology. On the other hand, "the
obscurity of nature" (p. 11) may make understanding difficult; it
hardly condones confused analysis. The "integral reality" is different
from what philosophers say about it; if legal positivists have improved
our methods of analysis and have shown insight into one phase of the
"integral reality", so much to the good. Particularism remains the
cardinal sin, and Professor Fuller properly castigates such excessive
claims by legal positivists. But what we find in this book seems, at
bottom, a definite bias against logic and the role of logic in law. It is
impossible here to argue the importance of so-called Legal Positivism;
I can simply assert that it has provided us with a tremendous wealth of
insight into the nature of law and legal ideas, "and suggest that one might
try to deal with such problems as rule of law, classification, codification,
stare decisis, and analogy, and see how far one gets without reliance
upon logical analysis. But the major point is that unless Analytical
Jurisprudence (Pure Theory) is treated as logic and logical method
applied to law, we do not come to grips with its essential contributions.
The final observation I should like to make concerns the use of the
terms "Natural Law" and, especially, "Positivism." In such a general
statement of main issues as he designed, Professor Fuller could not,
of course, indulge in any detailed inquiry into the relevant semantics.
Nonetheless one can learn helpful lessons from his endeavor. Clarification of the term "Positivism" seems essential, else one may slip into
condemnation rather than persevere in analysis; one may even give the
appearance of damning all science and of cherishing some mysticism
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that the modem world has shaken off; or one may simply rest in confused and comfortable ambiguity. It is to Professor Fuller's credit
that he has avoided these pitfalls as much as was humanly possible
under the circumstances of his writing; he was able to do so because he
confined himself to specific writers, whom he named. But read, e.g.
pages 8, 9, 64, 65; compare his interpretation of Morris Cohen as a
"positivist" (pp. 6-7) ; and decide whether Professor Fuller is a "posi-

tivist" or a "natural law" philosopher!
Professor Fuller would be the last to suggest that the subtitle "Lectures" should provide any immunity from criticism; it remains true that
the limitations of space inevitably bar elaboration or qualification that
full-length treatment would permit and require. Also such an occasion
called for a broad and rounded statement. It is from this viewpoint
that the book must be evaluated; judged thus, the book is both wise and
stimulating; its thoughtful scholarship is expressed in a graceful style
that represents a really fine literary achievement. Taking his stand upon
the most vital spot in modem jurisprudence, Professor Fuller has provided a remarkably well-organized and sustained analysis of the principal issues. I read his book twice, with increasing profit and enjoyment, and venture to predict that it will long be read and recognized as
an important contribution to the creation of an enduring American
philosophy of law.
JERoME HALL.
Indiana University Law School.
Cases and Materials on Legislation. By Frank E. Horack, Jr. Chicago: Callaghan & Co. 1940. Pp. xxix, 829. $7.00.
It is fair to say that no course in the law curriculum has excited so
much difference of opinion as the course in Legislation. Round Table
,discussions at the annual meetings of the Association of American Law
Schools and articles by teachers experimenting in this area, reveal strikingly contrasting emphases. Some advocate a study of the judicial
interpretation of statutes, others the relationship of legislative to judicial material, others a workshop in practical drafting, still others a comparative examination of legislative solutions of similar problems, and
a few a study of what is in effect state constitutional law.1 It was the
late Professor Ernst Freund who pioneered, in an area distinct from all
of these, an analysis of statutory devices calculated, as he viewed them,
to produce desired results with a minimum of restraint and friction.2
'As illustrative, see Davis, Instruction in Statute Law (1911) 6 ILL. L. REv.
126;2 Dodd, Statute Law and the Law School (1922) 1 N. C. L. REv. 1.
Freund, A Course in Statutes (1919)

4 Am. L. ScHoor. REv. 504. "Legisla-

tion as such also challenges attention and study where it transforms freedom
which is subject to necessary law, into freedom directed by rules of law which

